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ABSTRACT
A smart contract on a blockchain cannot keep a secret because its
data is replicated on all nodes in a network. To remedy this problem,
it has been suggested to combine blockchains with trusted execution
environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX, for executing applications
that demand privacy. As a consequence untrusted blockchain nodes
cannot get access to the data and computations inside the TEE.
This paper first explores some pitfalls that arise from the combi-
nation of TEEs with blockchains. Since smart contracts executed
inside TEEs are, in principle, stateless they are susceptible to roll-
back attacks, which should be prevented to maintain privacy for
the application. However, in blockchains with non-final consensus
protocols, such as the proof-of-work in Ethereum and others, the
contract execution must handle rollbacks by design. This implies
that TEEs for securing blockchain execution cannot be directly used
for such blockchains; this approach works only when the consensus
decisions are final.
Second, this work introduces an architecture and a prototype
for smart-contract execution within Intel SGX technology for Hy-
perledger Fabric, a prominent enterprise blockchain platform. Our
system resolves difficulties posed by the execute-order-validate
architecture of Fabric, prevents rollback attacks on TEE-based exe-
cution as far as possible, and minimizes the trusted computing base.
For increasing security, our design encapsulates each application on
the blockchain within its own enclave that shields it from the host
system. An evaluation shows that the overhead moving execution
into SGX is within 10%–20% for a sealed-bid auction application.
1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain and distributed ledger technology (DLT) have received
a lot of attention recently as means to distribute trust over many
nodes in a network. The transparency and resilience gained from the
decentralized protocol execution ensure the integrity of blockchain
applications, or smart contracts, realized on such a “world com-
puter.” However, the proliferation of data on a blockchain directly
contradicts the goal to keep the application state confidential and
to maintain privacy for its users, a condition that exists for many
intended applications of blockchain technology.
Although cryptographic protocols (such as secure multiparty
computation and zero-knowledge proofs) offer attractive solutions
for privacy on a blockchain, they are not yet mature enough to run
general-purpose computations easily and to be widely deployed. As
a promising alternative, the use of trusted execution environments
(TEEs) for running blockchain applications has been proposed, espe-
cially by the industry working on consortium blockchains, where the
consensus process is governed by controlled nodes [17, 32]. Intel’s
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is themost prominent TEE technol-
ogy today and available together with commodity CPUs [2, 18, 31].
It establishes trusted execution contexts called enclaves on a CPU,
which isolate data and programs from the host operating system in
hardware and ensure that outputs are correct. An enclave might
run only a small dedicated part of an application [11, 18, 29] or can
contain an entire legacy system, including some operating-system
support [5, 7, 44]. By using a TEE, one does not have to trust the
host system of the enclave, which runs the blockchain node and
participates in protocols.
For protecting smart contracts through TEEs, issues around roll-
back attacks, state continuity, and protocol integration for TEEs [42]
must be addressed. As is well-known, there are non-trivial inter-
actions between integrity violations and information leakage for
stateful secure computation [1].
Motivating example. Imagine an auction of a digital item on a
blockchain. In sealed-bid auction designs [34] (e.g., Vickrey auc-
tions) keeping the bids secret is of primary importance, so that
neither another bidder nor any other party can learn anything
about them. Only a trusted auctioneer should learn the bids to the
extent necessary for evaluating the auction. For moving the auction
to a blockchain, the functions of the auctioneer are implemented by
a smart contract. The distributed ledger stores encrypted bids such
that the bidders are able to verify that their submitted bids were
actually considered in the final evaluation. The blockchain nodes
execute the auction’s smart contract, which records the bids, closes
the auction, evaluates it, and autonomously executes the transac-
tion assigning the item to the winning bidder and transferring the
payment to the seller.
By running the auction’s code within an SGX enclave, the auc-
tion maintains privacy and simultaneously benefits from the trans-
parency of the blockchain. More precisely, the bids are encrypted,
the key to decrypt them resides only inside the enclave, and the
smart contract controls operations with the key. The bidders com-
mit their encrypted bids to the blockchain and the enclave decrypts
them for determining the winner. However, this simplistic auc-
tion solution may leak information, as described next, whenever a
malicious node can manipulate the operation invocation order.
State continuity and rollback attacks. As the industry is slowly
realizing, rollback attacks on stateful applications running in TEEs
pose serious risks, unless the state continuity of an application is
ensured [9, 30, 37, 42, 43]. For instance, if a malicious blockchain
node may influence the order in which transactions are executed by
the enclave, the node can break the confidentiality of the sealed-bid
auction even if it cannot decrypt the bids. In particular, the node
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might cause the enclave to execute the evaluation transaction mul-
tiple times and reset the enclave again afterwards, every time when
a new bid has been stored on the blockchain. Thereby the node
could learn information about other bids. This illustrates how an
integrity violation can lead to breaking confidentiality. (Although
platforms like SGX provide access to non-volatile monotonic coun-
ters that might prevent rollback attacks, their use introduces con-
siderable complications for tolerating crashes and they are often
too slow [9, 37]. Hence, we do not consider them in this work.)
Rollback attacks can be prevented if the state input to the smart-
contract enclave always corresponds to the unique, committed
blockchain state. One way to guarantee the desired state continuity
would be to run the whole blockchain node, especially its protocol
logic and the state maintenance, within the enclave. This is often not
feasible for practical reasons, however, and leads to other security
issues because the code running inside the TEE has a large attack
surface. However, in blockchain systems with non-final consensus
protocols that may fork temporarily, a node remains prone to being
rolled back by design, even when it resides completely in a TEE,
because the underlying consensus protocol requires it.
Contributions. In this paper we examine the state-continuity
problem for trusted execution on blockchains, arising from roll-
back attacks that malicious nodes might mount. We discuss why
blockchains with consensus that has no final decisions, such as
the “proof of work” in Bitcoin or Ethereum, are inherently unable
to benefit from TEEs to maintain confidentiality. If the blockchain
nodes hosting TEEs can access the final blockchain state in a trusted
way, on the other hand, then such rollbacks can be prevented.
As the main contribution of this work, we design a secure so-
lution for secure smart-contract execution on a blockchain using
Intel SGX, the most prominent TEE technology available today, and
Hyperledger Fabric [3], or Fabric for short, a flexible and modular
platform for consortium blockchains. Fabric uses a modular notion
of consensus whose outputs are always final, which avoids the
protocol-inherent rollback attack. As Fabric is the most prominent
technology for consortium blockchains today, our design can also
be integrated with other, similar systems.
Some consortium blockchain platforms follow the generic ap-
proach to state-machine replication [38], where a consensus proto-
col first decides on an order among all transactions and the nodes
subsequently execute them according to the decided order. In Fabric,
however, the peers execute transactions and compute state updates
before their relative order has been determined through a consensus
protocol. The ordering process only uses the outcome of the trans-
action (i.e., the induced state changes) during consensus. While this
offers a flexible programming model for smart contracts [3], it also
introduces additional complications that must be considered.
We have implemented a prototype that enables smart-contract
execution inside Intel SGX for Hyperledger Fabric. We demonstrate
an auction application and evaluate the performance of the pro-
totype compared to the unprotected execution. The results show
that our prototype reaches 0.80x–0.90x the throughput of the un-
protected implementation, which is acceptable for protecting the
confidentiality.
Organization. This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2
we discuss why public blockchains with non-final consensus are
inherently unable to execute smart contracts in TEEs. Section 3
introduces Intel SGX and Fabric, the two technologies used mostly
in the remainder of the paper. In Section 4 we introduce the system
model, describe the security goals, and discuss several approaches
to run smart contracts in TEEs and their complications. Our solution
to execute applications on Fabric with SGX is presented in Section 5
and its security is examined in Section 6. Performance evaluation
results are reported in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 reviews related
work and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 CONSENSUS WITH NON-FINAL DECISIONS
Public blockchains patterned after Bitcoin [35] do not reach con-
sensus with finality. Their consensus mechanism is based on a
randomized protocol, in which for each epoch (or “block height”) a
node selected through a probabilistic scheme that is difficult to bias
(such as a “proof of work”) disseminates a block of transactions
to be appended to the blockchain. Such blocks are propagated to
all nodes with a peer-to-peer gossip protocol that is efficient but
does not guarantee strict consistency. During regular operation,
the view of the nodes in different parts of the network may di-
verge, and such forks are resolved through the protocol rule that
the “longest” branch is adopted by all nodes as the valid blockchain
and determines the state. As shown by multiple formal analyses of
the protocol (e.g., [15]), the probability that such forks last for many
epochs vanishes exponentially fast, but it cannot be made negligible
for short forks. If the underlying network does not ensure universal
connectivity, this can lead to devastating attacks on the safety of a
public blockchain [4].
When a node first receives the block as a candidate that should
extend the current chain, the node validates the block’s content,
including that all transactions inside are correct. For Bitcoin this
validation is simply checking that a “coin state” has not been spent
earlier, but for programmable blockchains like Ethereum [45], this
entails executing all transactions and computing the correspond-
ing state updates. If the block is valid, the node appends the block
to its local chain and updates its state accordingly. But when the
node later receives other blocks that are all valid and collectively
extend a prefix of the currently held chain to a “longer” chain, the
node reverts the earlier transactions and instead executes the sub-
sequently received transactions. There is a significant probability
that a node has to revert transactions during regular operation
and, therefore, consensus is never final. In essence, a node must
continue to participate in the consensus protocol forever, just to be
sure that the blockchain state it holds remains valid. Blockchains
using “proof-of-stake” consensus also suffer from similar forks (see
the overview and analysis by David et al. [14]).
As becomes clear from this discussion, TEEs cannot be used to
secure transaction execution and validation in blockchains based
on non-final consensus. For example, an Ethereum virtual machine
(EVM) running within SGX would have to produce the outputs
resulting from a transaction immediately, but already during normal
operation, the EVM could be rolled back to an earlier state that
is beyond its control. This also holds if the consensus protocol
is executed inside the TEE, as a malicious host controlling the
communication could censor blocks from the network and forge
valid blocks of its choice, given enough time. As argued before
2
through the auction example, application-level secrets could be
revealed easily.
Therefore consensus with finality seems to be a necessary pre-
requisite to rely on TEEs for securing blockchains and for keeping
transaction data secret. If one lets the TEE execute only trans-
actions that are final, any attempt to roll back its state amounts
to an attack, and such attacks can be prevented using existing
methods for state continuity. This insight stands also behind some
of the early designs and technologies that aim at this goal. For
example, Microsoft’s Coco Framework [32], available only as a
white paper so far, uses the EVM but mentions quorum-based
consensus with finality. In the Hyperledger Sawtooth platform
(http://www.hyperledger.org/projects/sawtooth), which is most ac-
tively developed by Intel, the role of SGX technology lies in securing
the “proof-of-elapsed-time (PoET)” consensus protocol, but SGX is
not used for safeguarding secrets of a smart contract.
3 TECHNOLOGIES
In this section we review Hyperledger Fabric, an open-source
blockchain platform developed under the Hyperledger Project (http:
//www.hyperledger.org) hosted by the Linux Foundation. We then
describe Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX), which adds
hardware-enforced security to the Intel CPU architecture and en-
ables secure smart contract execution.
3.1 Hyperledger Fabric
Hyperledger Fabric [3] is a permissioned blockchain platform (run
by a consortium), where multiple parties may participate and to-
gether form a distributed ledger network. The ledger records all
interactions between the parties as transactions. A transaction
invokes a smart contract called chaincode, which defines an appli-
cation running on the blockchain.
A Fabric network consists of clients, peers, and an ordering service,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. For each peer, a special client called admin
has administrative control over the peer, for instance in order to
install a chaincode. The basic transaction flow is as follows: (1) A
client invokes a chaincode by sending a transaction proposal to
one or more peers, which (2) execute the chaincode and produce a
proposal response called endorsement. (3) The client then collects the
endorsements and assembles them to a transaction that it submits
to the ordering service. (4) The ordering service establishes the
total order of all transactions and broadcasts them as blocks of
transactions to all peers in the network. When a peer receives a
block, it validates every transaction, eliminates those that were
based on state that has become invalid, and commits the valid ones
to its local ledger.
Other blockchain platforms execute transactions after ordering
them [13], e.g., JPMC Quorum (https://github.com/jpmorganchase/
quorum), Hyperledger Sawtooth (https://github.com/hyperledger/
sawtooth-core), or Chain Core (https://chain.com/). In contrast,
Fabric uses a three-phase execute-order-validate architecture. In the
remainder of this section we provide more details of each phase.
Chaincode execution and endorsement. A transaction of a chain-
code is executed by a set of endorsing peers for the chaincode during
the endorsement phase. Initially the chaincode is installed on every
endorsing peer by an admin. The clients invoke the chaincode by
Fabric
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Figure 1: A high-level view of a Fabric network, illustrating
the transaction flow invoked by a client (left).
sending a transaction proposal containing a chaincode operation
to the peer. The chaincode takes the operation as input, processes
it according to its smart-contract application, and may return an
optional execution result.
While executing, the chaincode may access the blockchain state,
which is provided as a key-value store (KVS), with getState and
putState operations. The putState operation does not immediately
update the peers’ local state; instead, it records the change in a
writeset, containing the updated keys and their values. Additionally,
all keys accessed by the transaction during execution and their
versions (i.e., the positions in the history where they were last
updated) are collected in a so-called readset.
Taken together, the execution result, the readset, and the write-
set form a transaction proposal response or endorsement. The peer
returns this to the client. Through executing the chaincode and
producing the endorsement, the peer vouches for the correct exe-
cution of the chaincode and endorses the change. An endorsement
policy specifies the endorsing rules for each chaincode (e.g., who
are the endorsing peers or how many endorsements are needed).
Accordingly, the client collects sufficiently many endorsements and
integrates them to a transaction that it submits for ordering.
Ordering. The ordering service in Fabric is responsible for es-
tablishing the total order of all transactions in the blockchain and
therefore to ensure a consistent view of all transactions across all
peers. Typically, the ordering service consists of multiple nodes for
scalability and resilience, and leverages a protocol to reach consen-
sus on the total order. Clients submit transactions created in the
endorsement phase to the ordering service. For efficiency, transac-
tions are distributed among all peers in batches or blocks, using a
gossip protocol [6].
Validation and state updates. A peer receives a block of trans-
actions from the ordering service and utilizes a validation system
chaincode (VSCC) to validate each transaction and apply its effects
to the local ledger. Validation is a deterministic process and per-
formed by every peer. In particular, the peer checks that every
transaction fulfills the endorsement policy. Then, a read-write con-
flict check is performed, that is, the peer verifies that the versions
in the readset match the current blockchain state at the peer. If
both validation checks are successful, the updates in the writeset
of the transaction are applied to local blockchain state of the peer.
An invalid transaction has no effect on the state and the issuing
client should reinvoke the transaction again. A Fabric blockchain
is initialized through a so-called genesis block, which is created
collaboratively by all network participants.
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3.2 Trusted execution with Intel SGX
Modern trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Intel’s Soft-
ware Guard Extensions (SGX) [2, 18, 31], add hardware-enforced
security to commodity platforms. SGX enables Fabric peers to exe-
cute chaincode in a trusted execution context, also called enclave.
Particularly, an enclave defines an isolated memory area that is
guarded by hardware-enforced mechanisms, which guarantee con-
fidentiality and integrity of an enclave even if the entire platform
is compromised. That is, even higher-privileged code (e.g., the op-
erating system) can neither access that memory area nor modify it
without being detected.
Enclave protection and attestation. SGX enforces that only gen-
uine applications are executed in an enclave. “Genuine” means that
the code has not been tampered with and operates precisely as
intended by the developer. For this reason, a cryptographic hash
called mrenclave of the code and data initially loaded into the en-
clave is generated by the CPU. Ifmrenclavematches the hash of the
genuine application signed by the developer, the enclave starts suc-
cessfully. This ensures that the correct application (e.g., a specific
chaincode) is runs in an enclave.
During runtime, an enclave is capable to prove to a third party
(e.g., a Fabric client or another peer) that a specific application is
loaded and executed in an actual enclave on a SGX platform. For
this purpose a procedure called remote attestation [2] is used. It
works as follows: A client with prior information about mrenclave
of the target enclave sends an attestation challenge to the enclave
host (e.g., the peer) and in return receives a proof ϕ, also known as
quote, produced by a target enclave and the platform. We use the
term attestation report to refer to a quote. The client forwards ϕ to
the Intel Attestation Service (IAS), which verifies it using a group
signature scheme called EPID [12], and replies with an attestation
result. The attestation result either confirms that ϕ was actually
produced by an SGX enclave running the intended code or indicates
that ϕ is invalid. The enclave can also embed custom data in ϕ,
which builds the basis for key exchange protocols.
Remote attestation involves an intermediate step called local
attestation that is performed between two enclaves on the same
platform. In this step, a special enclave called Quoting Enclave (QE)
verifies that ϕ was produced by an enclave on the same platform,
using HMAC with a shared secret key only accessible by enclaves
on the same platform. Local attestation can be performed by any
two enclaves on the same platform.
Enclave state and data sealing. Since enclaves reside in a pro-
tected memory area in the CPU, enclaves are volatile, thus, when
an enclave stops, restarts, or just crashes, its internal state is lost
and cannot be recovered. For this reason SGX supports data sealing,
a mechanism that allows to encrypt and authenticate data before
it leaves an enclave and is stored externally (e.g., on persistent
storage). After an enclave restarts, it may load the sealed data and
decrypt it. Although the sealing mechanism protects data confi-
dentiality, it does not prevent rollback attacks, that is, an attacker
may cause an enclave to recover from properly sealed but stale
data [9, 30, 43]. For many applications this poses serious problems
and they must be protect against it, however, for stateless applica-
tions, such as chaincodes, this is not relevant.
Moreover, enclaves have access to a secure random number gen-
erator that allows to build cryptographic primitives, such as key
generation, encryption, and digital signatures. Both, remote attes-
tation and data sealing rely on a cryptographic key-management
infrastructure rooted in a secret key fused into the CPU, which
provides deterministic key-derivation functions to an enclave.
4 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
This section describes the problem of secure smart-contract execu-
tion using trusted hardware for blockchains with final consensus,
in particular, Hyperledger Fabric [3]. We explore intricacies that
may still be caused by rollback attacks in this setting, illustrate a
strawman approach that is infeasible, and introduce our approach
to support secure chaincode execution using Intel SGX. This exe-
cutes each chaincode in its own enclave during endorsement at a
peer and thereby protects the confidentiality and integrity of the
blockchain application.
4.1 System model
We consider a Fabric blockchain network with clients, an ordering
service, and a set of peers, which collaboratively execute transac-
tions and maintain a distributed ledger on a single Fabric “channel.”
A client invokes transactions by sending a chaincode operation
to some peer, which then executes (simulates) it and produces an
endorsement containing the resulting state change on the ledger.
The operation, the response, as well as the ledger may contain
sensitive information that should stay secret.
To prevent such information leakage, every peer is equipped
with an SGX-enabled CPU and executes transactions inside an
enclave. The chaincode is stateless, and a transaction only takes the
operation and the blockchain state in the KVS as inputs, accessed
with getState. The chaincode must perform updates to the ledger
only through putState operations. The execution of a chaincode
operation returns a response that may include a computation result,
the state update, and the read-write dependencies.
4.2 Threats
Although most peers are usually correct, a peer may become mali-
cious and behave incorrectly, for instance, when it tries to maximize
its own profit or becomes corrupted by an attacker. A peer has full
control over the operating system, applications, and the data resid-
ing in memory and persistent storage (i.e., the blockchain state). A
malicious peer, however, cannot access or tamper with the code and
data residing in an enclave (see Section 3.2). A malicious peer may
neither break cryptographic primitives nor extract any secret infor-
mation that from an enclave. Consequently, a chaincode running
in an enclave always produces the correct results, that is, the chain-
code does not deviate from its specification, the enclave-internal
state is only known to the enclave itself, and nothing is revealed
apart from the resulting state change.
However, a malicious peer can invoke the chaincode enclave
with any input and in arbitrary order. The peer may intercept,
modify, reorder, discard, or replay chaincode operations, and when
the chaincode enclave accesses the KVS, the peer may feed any
blockchain state to it.
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Furthermore, the peer might even drop messages or completely
halt an enclave, but we do not consider such denial-of-service at-
tacks in this work. We also ignore potential information leakage
from SGX on side channels [10, 39, 41, 46] because this appears
orthogonal to our focus.
As is well-known from the literature on secure computation with
cryptographic protocols [1], integrity and confidentiality cannot be
considered separately. Likewise, for a secure application running in
an enclave, a malicious host may break confidentiality by triggering
the enclave to execute on “incorrect” inputs. In the blockchain
context, this means that the chaincode execution deviates from the
consensus-based transaction order.
Repeating and extending the auction example from the intro-
duction, such an attack could reveal secret information as follows.
Suppose that evaluating the auction on the current blockchain
state s1 would let a bid b1 win the auction. If the malicious node can
trigger the auction-evaluation transaction, it learns b1. If the node
can reset the enclave to s1 and execute another transaction, it can
submit a bid b2, add it to the ledger, subsequently evaluate the auc-
tion, and learn if b2 > b1. Such a rollback attack clearly breaks the
confidentiality of the individual bids. As mentioned earlier, rollback
attacks on trusted execution environments and their prevention
has only recently been understood better [9, 30, 43].
4.3 Strawman approach
It follows from the discussion in Section 2 that letting the enclave
only execute transactions that have been ordered by the network
with finality prevents the rollback problem. This amounts to run-
ning the entire blockchain peer inside an enclave, as also suggested
by Microsoft Coco [32, 40] and related work. We call this the straw-
man approach that might work for an order-execute architecture
where the consensus process has only final decisions, but we argue
later why better designs exist.
For Fabric, the strawman design would mean to encapsulate the
chaincode execution, endorser, committer, ledger-state access, and
all other parts of a peer inside an enclave. This obviously protects
the integrity of the input sequence for the chaincode, since the
entire Fabric peer runs within SGX. A similar approach is taken in
the blockchain-as-a-service platform of IBM, which deploys Fabric
peer as a secure service container on an IBM Z system. The secure
container includes the whole operating system, middleware stack,
and blockchain platform [19].
Although no operating system is running within SGX, recent
research has demonstrated how legacy applications can run in SGX
through a library OS that executes unmodified applications in an
enclave [5, 7, 44]. Note that the library OS adds tens of thousands
of lines of code that also run along the application in the enclave.
This approach introduces multiple problems, however. First, it
stands in contrast to the important computer-security principle of
minimizing the size of the trusted computing base (TCB). Specifically,
also the SGX developer guidelines [21] recommend to partition an
application into a trusted and an untrusted component; only a small
portion of the application code should execute inside the enclave.
A smaller TCB has fewer errors, reduces the attack surface, and is
more amenable to security analysis than the entire application.
A second problem stems from the limited memory available to
enclaves. An enclave’s memory resides in the enclave page cache
(EPC) isolated from the rest of the system. The EPC is currently
limited to 128 MB. Once an enclave reaches that limit pages are
outsourced to DRAM. This results in a dramatic loss of performance,
as reported in several works [5, 11, 36]. In particular, since the ledger
grows with every block, holding the whole blockchain state in the
enclave quickly reaches the memory limitation.
4.4 Approach for Hyperledger Fabric
To avoid the drawbacks of the strawman approach, we adopt a
modular architecture that separates the chaincode execution con-
ceptually from the peer and moves the execution into an enclave.
The protocol-specific aspects of the peer are encapsulated in an
abstract ordering service, of which one process might run on the
same peer. The ordering service is trusted in the sense that it cannot
be rolled back.
The ordering service produces a signed sequence of transac-
tions for execution within the enclave. The enclave can verify that
transactions originate from the ordering service, are in the proper
order, and have not been tampered with. The enclave also keeps
information about the transaction history, which allows to detect
transaction-ordering violations or replayed transactions. The ma-
licious host might still reset the enclave to an earlier point in the
execution sequence, but this would not harm the application since
the transactions are deterministic and execution would simply pro-
duce the same outputs again.
As described so far, this approach works fine with an order-
execute architecture for state-machine replication. Fabric, however,
uses the execute-order-validate paradigm, where a peer executes a
transaction before consensus on the order is reached (see Sec. 3.1).
Consequently the execution is speculative and can be repeated
without affecting the blockchain state, as transactions are simulated
during endorsement and only take effect after the ordering. This
means a malicious host could infer information about the secret
application data from the speculative execution. Not even a trusted
ordering service can prevent this type of leakage.
To resolve this issue, we will have to adapt the applications to
respect the speculative nature of execution in Fabric. For the auction
example, in particular, a barrier will be stored on the blockchain
such that the chaincode enclave only evaluates the auction if the
barrier is present. The barrier is set by invoking the chaincode with
a transaction to “close” the auction but not yet evaluate it. If the
barrier is present on the ledger, a malicious peer may no longer
submit new bids to the auction. On the other hand, the auction
evaluation will only consider bids added to the ledger before the
barrier. Note that this barrier plays a role similar to a memory
barrier in a multi-core computer system with concurrent threads.
Following the execute-order-validate architecture, the chain-
code enclave must execute transactions only on the committed
blockchain state, that is, with ledger entries that result from ordered
transactions and that have been committed by all peers. Otherwise
a malicious peer may produce the barrier itself and feed the result-
ing state into the enclave when evaluating the auction. The system
described in the next section ensures this.
To formally model the information leakage permitted in the
execute-order-validate architecture of Fabric, wemodel a blockchain
5
as stateful functionality F : S × T → S. At any time the state of
the chaincode is an element of S. The clients invoke transactions
in T , which may contain operations with arguments according
to F , but these are subsumed into the different t ∈ T . Given s ∈ S,
applying a transaction t ∈ T of F means to compute s ′ ← F (s, t),
resulting in a subsequent state s ′ ∈ S. Using a trusted ordering
service as introduced earlier, the blockchain’s state evolution is
defined through the sequence of transactions signed by ordering.
With the chaincode functionality F running in an SGX enclave,
even a malicious peer may only learn the subsequent state result-
ing from a transaction, but nothing about the computation itself.
Since cryptographic keys could reside in the enclave, the ledger
state doesn’t necessarily reveal all relevant information. Due to
the rollback attacks introduced earlier, however, such a peer can
execute any transaction on any input state that is in the history of
transactions issued by the ordering service.
Definition 4.1 (Security up to resets). Consider a blockchain sys-
tem with an execute-order-validate architecture and suppose the
correct ordering service produces a sequence of states ⟨s0, s1, . . . , sm⟩,
where sj = F (sj−1, tj ) for tj ∈ T and j ∈ [1,m]. We say that the
chaincode is secure up to resets if any malicious peer, through inter-
acting with the chaincode running inside the enclave, may obtain
states s∗k+1 = F (sk , t∗), for any k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} and an arbitrary
transaction t∗ ∈ T , but no further information.
The security-up-to-resets notion formalizes attacks on TEE-
based execution in Fabric, where a malicious peer may collude
with a client. The client invokes an arbitrary transaction t∗ that
reveals information about the chaincode’s state. The peer lets the
TEE execute t∗ and produce an output, but the endorsement is
never sent for ordering and the transaction is never appended to
the blockchain. The chaincode may leak all states resulting from
such executions.
Note that Fabric permits parallelism during execution for sepa-
rating trust assumptions and for increasing scalability. By adding a
barrier into the blockchain, an application essentially benefits from
the guarantees of the order-execute design with respect to rollbacks
across the barrier. Requiring a barrier after every transaction would
actually impose the order-execute paradigm onto Fabric.
5 SECURE CHAINCODE EXECUTION
This section describes our system for secure chaincode execution
in Hyperledger Fabric using Intel SGX.
5.1 System architecture
Our approach extends a Fabric peer with the following compo-
nents: A chaincode enclave that executes a particular chaincode and
a ledger enclave that enables all chaincode enclaves to verify the
blockchain state integrity; all run inside SGX. In the untrusted part
of the peer, an enclave registry maintains the identities of all chain-
code enclaves and an enclave transaction validator that is respon-
sible for validating transactions executed by a chaincode enclave
before committing them to the ledger. Fig. 2 shows the components.
Chaincode enclave. The chaincode enclave executes one particu-
lar chaincode, and thereby isolates it from the peer and from other
chaincodes. A chaincode library acts as intermediary between the
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Figure 2: System architecture. The dashed box denotes the
components added to the peer to enable secure chaincode
execution with SGX. The components running within SGX
enclaves are denoted in green (or dark) color.
chaincode in the enclave and the peer. The chaincode library ex-
poses the Fabric chaincode interface and extends it with additional
support for state encryption, attestation, and secure blockchain
state access.
Ledger enclave. The ledger enclave maintains the ledger in an
enclave in the form of integrity-specific metadata representing the
most recent blockchain state. It performs the same validation steps
as the peer (see Sec. 3.1) when a new block arrives, but addition-
ally generates a cryptographic hash of each key-value pair of the
blockchain state and stores it within the enclave. The ledger en-
clave exposes an interface to the chaincode enclave for accessing the
integrity-specific metadata. This is used to verify the correctness
of the data retrieved from the blockchain state.
Enclave registry. The enclave registry is a chaincode that runs
outside SGX and maintains a list of all existing chaincode enclaves
in the network. It performs attestation (see Sec. 3.2) with the chain-
code enclave and stores the attestation result on the blockchain.
The attestation demonstrates that a specific chaincode executes in
an actual enclave. This enables the peers and the clients to inspect
the attestation of a chaincode enclave before invoking chaincode
operations or committing state changes.
Enclave transaction validator. The enclave transaction validator
complements the peer’s validation system and is responsible for
validating transactions produced by a chaincode enclave. In par-
ticular, the enclave transaction validator checks that a transaction
contains a valid signature issued by a registered chaincode enclave.
If the validation is successful, it marks the transactions as valid and
hands it over to the ledger enclave, which crosschecks the decision
before it finally commits the transaction to the ledger.
5.2 System initialization
When a peer joins the blockchain network, the ledger enclave is
initialized by the admin with the genesis block, which contains
the blockchain configuration and the expected hash (mrenclave)
of the ledger enclave. If the actual mrenclave obtained by the peer
does not match the value in the genesis block, the ledger enclave
does not proceed with the initialization. The ledger enclave then
generates a private/public key pair (SKLE , PKLE ), which allows to
uniquely identify the ledger enclave. The public key is revealed
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to the chaincode enclaves whereas the private key is kept secret
within the ledger enclave.
The ledger enclave maintains several configuration values ini-
tially obtained from the genesis block, such as the identities (i.e.,
public keys) of the peers, the clients, and the ordering service, which
are used to authenticate all received blocks and transactions. The
ledger enclave only accepts blocks that come from the ordering
service as defined in the genesis block. To ensure this, it verifies that
each block has a valid signature issued by the ordering service. Note
that the blockchain consortium configuration can be updated using
configuration transactions. For simplicity, however, we assume a
static consortium.
Every block has a sequence number and contains a list of trans-
actions. The ledger enclave maintains information about the most
recently processed transaction, to ensure that all blocks are pro-
cessed in the correct order and no blocks are missing.
Once the peer has joined the network and has started its ledger
enclave, the peer admin also installs the enclave registry on every
peer and instantiates it. This completes the initialization of the peer.
5.3 Chaincode enclave bootstrapping
We now describe how to initialize a chaincode enclave. This is
initiated by the peer admin and consists of the following phases:
(1) creating the chaincode enclave; (2) registering with the enclave
registry; (3) provisioning of secrets; and (4) binding the chaincode
enclave to the ledger enclave. These phases are explained next.
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Figure 3: Enclave registration process.
In the first phase, the admin installs the chaincode enclave at
the peer and then sends a setup transaction proposal. The peer
then starts the chaincode enclave, which generates a private/public
key pair (SKCC , PKCC ). As for the ledger enclave, the public key is
used to uniquely identify the chaincode enclave.
Second, the chaincode enclave registers itself with the enclave
registry as shown in Fig. 3. For this purpose, the chaincode enclave
calls register and in turn, the enclave registry performs remote
attestation of the chaincode, as described in Section 3.2. In detail,
the chaincode enclave first produces an attestation report that man-
ifests that it is properly instantiated with a specific chaincode and it
is identified by PKCC . The report contains mrenclaveCC and (hash
of) PKCC . The chaincode enclave then calls register at the en-
clave registry with the report and its public key as arguments. The
enclave registry first checks that the report contains the expected
mrenclaveCC and the correct hash of PKCC . Subsequently, it sends
the report to the IAS for verification and in return receives an at-
testation result, which shows whether the report was valid or not.
Note that the attestation result is signed by the IAS and its veri-
fication key is publicly available. If the verification succeeds, the
enclave registry completes the registration by calling putState to
store the attestation result together with PKCC on the ledger. This
makes the attestation result accessible to all peers in the network
through the ledger, certifying that this enclave runs the particular
chaincode on the given peer. Clients and other peers use this in two
ways. First, a client verifies that it invokes transactions involving
secret data on an enclave authorized for this. Second, the enclave
transaction validator of a peer, which updates the blockchain state,
verifies that the execution results are genuine and result from the
secure execution in the enclave.
After successfully registering the chaincode enclave, the admin
optionally provisions the chaincode enclave with secrets. For in-
stance, the admin may inject an encryption key for data stored on
the blockchain into the chaincode enclave (see also Sec. 5.5).
In the last phase, the chaincode enclave binds to the ledger en-
clave through local attestation (see Sec. 3.2). This means that the
chaincode enclave requests the ledger enclave to prove that it is
runs the expected ledger-enclave code and runs on the same host
platform. The ledger enclave produces an attestation report and
returns it to the chaincode enclave, which then performs the same
verification steps as described above. (In contrast to remote attesta-
tion, the cryptographic protection of local attestation uses HMAC
and a shared key for verification, provided by the SGX platform.) If
the verification succeeds, the chaincode enclave stores the ledger
enclave’s public key PKLE and thereby binds itself to the ledger en-
clave, in the sense that the chaincode enclave uses this for verifying
accesses to the blockchain state. The chaincode enclave rejects any
blockchain state values not originating from this ledger enclave.
5.4 Chaincode execution
Endorsement. A client triggers the chaincode execution by send-
ing an invoke transaction proposal with a chaincode operation
to the peer. The peer forwards the chaincode operation to the
chaincode enclave, which then processes it according to the smart
contract. The chaincode enclave prepares a response and returns it
to the peer, which subsequently sends it as a a transaction proposal
response to the client.
In more detail, prior to invoking the chaincode enclave, the client
queries the peer to retrieve the enclave’s public key PKCC and the
corresponding attestation result from the enclave registry. The
client then verifies the authenticity of the attestation result, using
the IAS verification key, and checks that the attestation contains the
expected mrenclave of the chaincode enclave, matching PKCC . If
the verification succeeds, the client invokes the chaincode enclave
by preparing a transaction proposal for the target chaincode. In
particular, the client encrypts the chaincode operation using PKCC ,
and then sends the proposal to the peer, which extracts the chain-
code operation and relays it to the chaincode enclave. Inside the
enclave, the chaincode library decrypts the operation using SKCC
and invokes the chaincode with the operation as argument.
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The chaincode processes the operation, produces a result, and
returns it to the chaincode library. The chaincode may access the
blockchain state using the chaincode library, which performs veri-
fies the accesses as described in Section 5.5.
To complete the chaincode invocation, the enclave library creates
a response, signs it using SKCC , and returns it to the peer. The
response includes the operation, the readset and the writeset, and
the execution result. Optionally, the chaincode library encrypts the
execution result before it leaves the enclave using an encryption
key provided by the client. The peer then sends the transaction
proposal response back to the client, which outputs the execution
result, and submits the transaction to the ordering service.
Validation and state update. The ordering service accepts trans-
actions submitted by the clients, assigns them to a block, and broad-
casts the block to all peers in the network. In order to finalize a
transaction, every peer validates the transaction and updates its
ledger copy.
For validating transactions produced by a chaincode enclave, the
enclave transaction validator essentially performs the same steps
as the validation system chaincode (VSCC), checking for conflicts
and evaluating the endorsement policy (Sec. 3.1). Additionally it
verifies that the transaction was produced by the correct chaincode
enclave as follows. The validator accesses the enclave registry to
retrieve the attestation result and public key for the enclave indi-
cated by the transaction. Then it verifies these following the same
steps as described earlier. Subsequently, it also verifies the enclave’s
signature on the transaction. If this succeeds, the enclave trans-
action validator marks the transaction as valid, the peer commits
the transaction to its local ledger, and updates the blockchain state
accordingly.
5.5 Accessing the blockchain state
Recall that a chaincode in Fabric must only use and access state
on the blockchain. The chaincode library together with the ledger
enclave protects this data from manipulation by the local peer.
State integrity and consistency. As illustrated in Fig. 4, when the
chaincode calls getState(k) to access the data for key k , the chain-
code library loads the corresponding value val from the blockchain
state in the enclave through chaincode API provided by the peer.
Additionally, the chaincode library requests the corresponding in-
tegrity metadata from the ledger enclave by calling getMeta(k, z)
with a nonce z. The ledger enclave returns the expected hash hval
of val in the blockchain state and a signature ϕ, produced by the
ledger enclave as ϕ = signSKLE (k ∥z∥hval). The chaincode library
has obtained PKLE during bootstrapping and uses this to verify ϕ.
If the signature verification over k ∥z∥Hash(val) succeeds, then val
is correct according to the state of the ledger enclave. The nonce
ensures that the response is fresh.
State confidentiality. The chaincode library may also protect the
confidentiality of the blockchain state maintained by the chaincode
enclave. The native data sealing method of SGX for protecting
persistent data (Sec. 3.2) is not suitable for data shared by multiple
enclaves on different peers. The reason is that sealed data can only
be unsealed again by the same enclave.
Ledger 
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getState() getState()
value
Integrity 
metadata
value
verify()
Blockchain 
state
Chaincode enclave
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libraryChaincode
Figure 4: Blockchain state verification with the help of the
ledger enclave.
Instead, the chaincode library provides a state-encryption mech-
anism that supports two modes: client-based encryption and en-
cryption per chaincode. With client-based encryption, the client is
responsible for key management and must provide an encryption
key together with each chaincode operation. For chaincode-based
encryption, a chaincode-specific key must be provisioned by an ad-
min to all chaincode enclaves during bootstrapping. In both modes,
encryption and decryption occur transparently to the chaincode
during the putState and getState calls, respectively.
As an additional benefit of client- or chaincode-based key man-
agement compared to SGX-native methods, data on the blockchain
can also be retrieved from the blockchain later, without the support
of an enclave.
5.6 Reboot and recovery support
A system crash or reboot terminates all enclaves instantiated on
the peer. In order to tolerate these without manual intervention,
the internal states of each chaincode enclave and the ledger enclave
are stored on persistent storage periodically.
The ledger enclave leverages sealing (Sec. 3.2) to protect its state
(including integrity metadata and private key). For ensuring state
continuity across crashes, the peer, in principle, has to write the
ledger-enclave state to disk synchronously after each block has
been processed. This clearly impacts the performance and can be
mitigated in practice by defining a block interval for persisting the
enclave state.
The chaincode enclave, in contrast, only has immutable state
(including its private key) that was created during the enclave
bootstrapping. It is sufficient to seal and store this once, after ini-
tialization. When the chaincode enclave restarts and restores itself
from the sealed state, it will retain the same enclave identity and
does not need to perform registration or remote attestation again.
5.7 Extensions
Support for confidential chaincode. Our chaincode enclave can
be also extended to support the execution of confidential chaincode,
which requires support for dynamic loading of encrypted code in
enclaves [16, 44]. This allows to deploy proprietary smart-contract
code without revealing it to the executing peers.
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To enable this feature, the chaincode enclave is extended with
a bootloader that injects an encrypted chaincode binary in the
enclave. The bootloader then decrypts it and executes the chaincode.
For this purpose, the admin that installs the chaincode on a peer, or
the chaincode developer, encrypts the chaincode binary for a the
chaincode enclave using its public key.
Furthermore, the attestation functionality of the chaincode en-
clave has to be adapted so that the peers and clients can verify that
a specific, encrypted chaincode is executed by the enclave. Since
mrenclave denotes the bootloader code running in the enclave, the
attestation must also contain a hash of the chaincode binary, which
is publicly known by the peers and clients.
Trusted state transfer. When a peer joins an existing blockchain
it has to validate all blocks processed before and reconstruct the
current blockchain state. Depending on the age of the blockchain,
this effort may be prohibitive. Also, a peer might have been offline
for a longer time and must catch up when it comes online again.
If the peer does not want to trust another peer for providing
it the most recent blockchain state, then it can leverage a ledger
enclave to obtain the current state securely.
When peer PA joins or resumes after a long intermission, it con-
tacts another peer PB for support. PA sends a message containing
the hash of the genesis block and integrity metadata dependent on
the position of its ledger enclave LEA on the blockchain. Peer PB
passes this to its ledger enclave LEB , which performs four steps: (1)
It checks that LEA is part of the same blockchain by comparing the
hashes of the genesis blocks; (2) it calculates the difference ∆ (in
terms of KVS keys) between PA’s state and its own state from PA’s
integrity metadata; (3) it creates an attestation report containing
∆ and its last known block sequence number; and (4) it returns
the report and ∆ to PB . At this point ∆ only contains KVS keys
and the corresponding integrity metadata, thus, PB complements ∆
with the actual values from the blockchain state. PB also sends
the attestation report to the IAS for verification. Next, PB sends
the attestation result and ∆ to PA, and PA verifies its contents. If
successful, then PA updates its last known block sequence number
and its blockchain state accordingly, and passes the data to LEA,
which performs the same verification steps as the peer and also
updates the integrity metadata.
6 SECURITY
This section argues that the secure chaincode execution system
presented in the previous section preserves security up to resets.
Recall that this security notion is defined with reference to a se-
quence of blockchain states produced by transactions as decided
by the trusted ordering service O. For being secure up to resets,
any set of malicious peers interacting with SGX TEEs that host a
chaincode CC deployed on Fabric must not be able to infer more
than what is given from any transaction of CC invoked on one of
these states. Our informal argument proceeds in three steps.
1. Any state update (in the form of a writeset) produced by a chain-
code enclave with a public key PKCC∗ and accepted by a ledger en-
clave into the state of its peer originates from an enclave whose at-
testation report is stored on the ledger with public key PKCC∗ . Fur-
thermore, any transaction output produced by a chaincode enclave,
for which a correct client has successfully attested the output to an
enclave with key PKCC∗ .
This follows from the operations of the enclave registry and the
enclave transaction validator. In particular, the enclave registry per-
forms remote attestation with the chaincode enclave and thereby
creates the attestation report that it stores in the ledger. This con-
vinces the clients and the peers that the chaincode enclave has been
instantiated with the chaincode represented by the mrenclaveCC
value in the ledger. The correct clients and peers obtain their state
in the form of the sequence of blocks with updates from O and can
verify the integrity of the state updates signed by PKCC∗ .
2. On any peer, the ledger state entries obtained by chaincode CC
inside an enclave represent the blockchain state after executing a pre-
fix of the sequence of valid state updates that are output by O.
Note that a malicious peer may reset the ledger enclave at will to
one of the sealed and persistently stored states that the enclave pro-
duces. Due to the VSCC checks and the monotonically increasing
sequence of block numbers that the ledger enclave expects from O,
the blockchain state represented within the ledger enclave always
results from executing the sequence of transactions determined by
O and deemed valid by VSCC and the endorsement policies. When
the chaincode inside the chaincode enclave accesses state in the
KVS, the mutual authentication between the ledger and the chain-
code enclave, and the blockchain state-verification mechanism in
Section 5.5 ensure that the state entries obtained by CC are correct
according to the state of the ledger enclave. Since the ledger enclave
holds the state after executing a prefix of the transaction sequence
from O, the above statement follows.
3. Any state held by a chaincode within an enclave remains confi-
dential up to what is revealed by executing transactions of the chain-
code, invoked on a prefix of the complete sequence of valid state up-
dates that are output by O.
This holds because the enclaves’ execution logic and data are
protected within the TEE. Contents of the ledger enclave are sealed
before they are written to persistent storage, hence they cannot be
altered by a malicious peer without being detected. The state of
the chaincode enclave itself remains unchanged after initialization
and is stored by the peer. However, all correct peers verify that
they only interact with chaincode enclaves registered on the ledger
itself. The ledger enclave may also contain an encryption key for
protecting data on the ledger through the chaincode library, which
handles state encryption and decryption transparently.
7 EVALUATION
We have built a prototype of the design for secure chaincode execut-
ing using Intel SGX with Hyperledger Fabric. This section describes
the implementation and reports on the evaluation of the SGX pro-
totype for the blockchain auction application.
7.1 Implementation
We implemented the prototype on top of Hyperledger Fabric 1.0.
Each component of the architecture in Section 5.1 has been inte-
grated with the Fabric peer code. We use the Intel SGX SDK for
Linux 2.1.2 [22] to implement the components residing in an enclave
such as the chaincode library and the chaincode. These components
are written in C/C++. The other components, such as the untrusted
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part of the chaincode enclave, the enclave registry, and the enclave
transaction validator are written in Go.
The ledger enclave runs as a system chaincode, which allows it
to be integrated in the peer without major changes. This means that
the chaincode enclave can access the ledger enclave via chaincode-
to-chaincode (cc2cc) invocations. The ledger enclave uses a simple
KVS based on std::map to store the integrity metadata.
The prototype supports a subset of the original fabric chain-
code shim and provides getState, getRangeQuery, and putState calls.
Those functions are implemented with the help of the untrusted
part of the chaincode enclave and manage the data in the KVS on
persistent storage. When the chaincode accesses the KVS to re-
trieve a value, the prototype contacts the trusted ledger enclave via
a cc2cc invocation in order to retrieve the corresponding integrity
metadata. This integrity protection uses HMAC-SHA256 with a
verification key generated during bootstrapping (Sec. 5.3).
The enclave registry interacts with the IAS using REST. The
registry is complemented by a custom VSCC that runs on all peers
and that verifies the attestation report returned by the IAS. The
enclave transaction validator is implemented in the form of a custom
VSCC. It verifies the SGX-specific signatures on the response for
the transactions produced by the chaincode enclave, and obtains
the corresponding public key from the enclave registry. Signatures
use 256-bit ECDSA, as provided by Go v1.10 and the SGX SDK.
The ledger state as well as the transaction proposals and proposal
responses are encrypted by default with 128-bit AES-GCM. The
AES key for encrypting the proposal is established using a Diffie-
Hellman key derivation scheme available within SGX.
7.2 Auction prototype
In order to demonstrate and evaluate the overhead of the approach,
we have implemented the blockchain auction mentioned earlier.
The auction chaincode runs in an enclave. A client, the auction-
eer, creates a new auction by invoking create(params) at a peer, and
receives in return a unique auction identifier auction, which is used
for any subsequent interaction with this auction. The invocation
specifies a name for the auction, a description of the asset, and
more. When creating a new auction, the chaincode accesses the
KVS (using getState) and ensures that no auction with the same
name already exists. Then it stores params using putState and ini-
tializes a placeholder that will store the bids. After the auction has
been created, it becomes active and remains so until the auctioneer
invokes close(auction).
While the auction is active, clients acting as bidders may submit
encrypted bids to the auction by invoking bid(val, auction), where
val denotes the value the bidder wants to offer for the asset. Each
bid is stored on the blockchain as a tuple of the form (key, val) =
(auction.client, val).
The auctioneer may close the auction at an arbitrary time by in-
voking close(auction). This transaction acts as the barrier described
in Section 4 and writes the updated auction status to the blockchain
using putState. Once the auctioneer sees from its ledger that the
auction is closed, it invokes evaluate(auction). When the chaincode
enclave receives this transaction, it determines the bidder with the
highest bid and issues the transfer of the asset in exchange of the
value of the bid.
7.3 Experimental setup
We deploy a Fabric networkwith a solo ordering service (one trusted
node) using a single channel and three peers. Each peer and the
ordering service run on a separate Supermicro 5019-MR server with
a 3.4GHz four-core E3-1230 V5 Intel CPU that provides SGX support.
All machines are equipped with 32 GB of memory, 1 Gbps network
connection, and a SATA SSD drive; they run Ubuntu Linux 16.04
LTS Server with the generic 4.13.0-32 Linux kernel. For reporting
transaction throughput we use an increasing number of clients build
with the Fabric Client SDK for Go (https://github.com/hyperledger/
fabric-sdk-go) invoking concurrent transaction over a period of at
least 30 seconds and report the average.
As a baseline for our experiments we run the same auction chain-
code written in Go in an unprotected environment, executed by an
unmodified Fabric peer. For comparison this chaincode also uses
128-bit AES-GCM encryption to seal bids and to encrypt the auction
state. However, since the peer knows the key, this does not hide
the auction data from the peer.
7.4 Measurements
TCB Size. The trusted computing base (TCB) of our prototype
includes the chaincode enclave and the ledger enclave; all other
components of the peer are considered to be untrusted. Taken to-
gether, the system consists of approximately 5,000 lines of trusted
C/C++ code and 4,000 lines of untrusted C/C++ and Go code. The
trusted ledger enclave makes up the majority of the code base, with
roughly 3,800 lines, whereas the chaincode enclave only comprises
about 1,200 lines. The auction chaincode itself is 200 lines of C/C++.
In contrast to a solution where the entire Fabric peer (≥ 100, 000
lines) or the entire Linux kernel (≥ 25M lines) is executed in the
trusted environment, our approach clearly fulfills the goal of mini-
mizing the TCB. This facilitates its security analysis through code
reviews or automated verification.
Transaction size. In a preliminary experiment we evaluated the
transaction sizes for the auction transactions. We observed an aver-
age transaction size of 3kB for bid() and 3.5kB for evaluate() (with
a readset containing 10 bids). The transactions contain a constant
overhead of about 100B for a 256-bit ECDSA signature that is format-
ted with JSON and produced by the chaincode enclave as described
in Section 5. The overhead introduced by our approach in relation
to the given transaction size in Fabric remains relatively small. As
also reported in [3], transaction in Fabric are large because they
contain PEM-encoded certificates.
Transaction endorsement. Nextwe study the endorsement through-
put and latency of our approach with an increasing the number of
clients. In this workload we use up to 128 clients, which concur-
rently invoke transactions at a single endorsement peer. Each client
invokes noop and submit transactions in a closed loop, respectively.
The auction chaincode returns immediately for a noop. The submit
transaction, on the other hand, receives a bid, encrypts it, and stores
it on the blockchain. We compare the auction chaincode executed
in the SGX enclave with the native, unprotected execution.
As Fig. 5 shows, the throughput and the latency of the noop trans-
action behave almost identically. The SGX-based approach follows
the baseline and scales almost linearly until reaching saturation at
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Figure 5: Endorsement throughput with different numbers
of clients.
mean σt tmin tmax
Decrypt tx 0.20 0.04 0.17 0.38
getState 0.37 0.23 0.12 4.54
cc2cc 2.59 1.42 1.08 11.44
Ledger enclave 0.68 0.16 0.52 1.42
Decrypt & verify state 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.38
Sign response 0.226 0.045 0.179 0.402
Table 1: Endorsement latency breakdown for submit trans-
action with 4 clients showing the average response time in
milliseconds.
16 clients. We observe that for the noop transaction our approach
reaches 0.93x–0.99x the throughput of the native execution. On the
other hand, when executing submit transactions execution in SGX
reaches 0.55x–95x the throughput of the native execution. In par-
ticular, before saturation our approach shows an increased latency
of about 6ms compared to the native execution. The reason is that
the auction chaincode invokes getState to retrieve data from the
KVS and additionally fetches the corresponding integrity metadata
from the ledger enclave using cc2cc invocations. We profiled the
response latency and present the breakdown in Table 1. The table
shows that retrieving data from the KVS takes 0.37ms, whereas
cc2cc invocation takes 2.59ms to return. The actual invocation of
the ledger enclave takes less than a millisecond, thus the majority
of the response time is spent for the communication between the
two chaincodes. In this experiment we see that cc2cc invocations
are relatively expensive. Our choice of implementing the ledger en-
clave as a chaincode allowed for a simple integration and coupling
with the chaincode enclave, but it comes with noticeable overhead.
This overhead can be reduced by moving the ledger enclave into
the peer itself, so that it directly provides Fabric’s chaincode API.
Auction evaluation. Wealso investigate the performance of range
queries used by the auction chaincode to read all submitted bids for
determining the winner. We measure the response latency for the
evaluate transaction for different numbers of submitted bids, shown
in Fig. 6. As expected, we observe that latency increases with larger
number of submitted bids. The relative overhead of executing in
an SGX enclave remains constant for a small number of submitted
bids, at about 20%, and for larger numbers it decreases to 10%. This
experiment shows that using range queries reduces the number of
cc2cc invocations, which improves the performance.
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Figure 6: Auction evaluation latency with different number
of submitted bids.
End-to-End performance. In the last experiment we study over-
all end-to-end response latency for the auction. The workload is
the same as in the transaction endorsement experiment but here
we measure the throughput and latency for the entire transaction
flow including endorsement, ordering, and validation. We use the
default block size configuration with 10 transactions per block. We
observe that execution in SGX reaches 0.80x–0.95x of the through-
put achieved by the native execution, as shown in Fig. 7.
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Figure 7: End-to-end throughput with different numbers of
clients.
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8 RELATEDWORK
Trusted execution technology is envisaged to play an important role
in the context of blockchains, especially for enterprise applications
and in consortium blockchains. The two most prominent uses of
TEEs are to execute smart contracts for keeping data private and to
represent off-chain data securely. We review these two and further
related applications of TEEs in this section.
Smart-contract executionwith Intel SGX. Several approaches have
recently suggested to execute blockchain applications and smart
contracts within Intel SGX.
The most prominent among these and most closely related to our
work is the Coco framework, announced by Microsoft in a white
paper [32]. It provides a set of building blocks based on Intel SGX
that can be used to secure blockchain systems. Coco integrates
consensus algorithms, distributed ledger state, and a runtime envi-
ronment for executing smart-contract transactions in SGX enclaves.
It appears to be derived from Ethereum and mentions the Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM) for its core data structures and protocols.
The components of Coco are described as potentially separate en-
claves, but conceptually the entire blockchain node (corresponding
to a peer in Fabric) resides in SGX. Coco exploits concepts from a
proposed related blockchain system called VOLT [40]. Since only a
white paper for Coco is available, however, it is difficult to clearly
assess the framework. It is clear that Coco suffers from a large TCB
with its problems as discussed in Section 4.3, including potential
malicious interactions across smart contracts. Our approach isolates
each application within its own enclave with the minimal amount of
code necessary and follows the philosophy of minimizing the TCB.
The R3 Corda distributed ledger platform has also announced a
privacy feature using SGX in a white paper [17]. In Corda, some
aspects of the transaction validation are envisaged to take place
inside an SGX enclave, potentially running at untrusted nodes. By
executing the transaction validation in an enclave, the identities
involved in a transaction can be encrypted on the blockchain and
are only revealed inside an enclave during validation. Corda strives
to port a Java runtime environment (JRE) in order to execute na-
tive Corda smart contracts within an enclave. Compared to our
approach, this introduces some runtime overhead for the JRE and
an increased attack surface with the larger TCB, but it benefits from
portability of the applications written in the same language.
The IBMBlockchain Platform [20] offers an enterprise blockchain-
as-a-service solution allowing for deployment of a Fabric network
using Secure Service Container (SSC) technology [19] on IBM Z
systems. The platform runs the whole peer and its Linux operating
system within a secure container, which is shielded from access of
the host and host administrator, similar to SGX. This means that run-
ning Fabric within a Secure Service Container requires specialized
mainframe hardware and has a large TCB. In contrast, our approach
for running Fabric with SGX works with commodity systems and
minimizes the TCB for each smart-contract application.
Several academic papers have also suggested to run smart con-
tracts inside SGX for confidentiality, e.g., in the “Ring of Gyges” [23]
or in Hawk [26].
Blockchain oracles and off-chain data. Other works [33, 47] re-
alize trusted “oracles” for blockchain smart contracts using SGX.
Oracles are data feeds external to the blockchain that inform a
smart contract about “facts” in the environment. They extend the
scope of inputs to which an application can respond and serve as
trusted sources and triggers for actions on the blockchain. Lever-
aging trusted execution technology enhances the trustworthiness
of an oracle and allows to verify the correctness of the data source.
This work is orthogonal to our approach, which could also benefit
from oracles that exploit trusted hardware.
Teechain [28] is a system to perform off-chain payments on top
of Bitcoin. It leverages SGX to establish stateful payment chan-
nels among mistrusting parties. Such off-chain channels resolve
exchanges bilaterally without incurring a blockchain transaction
for every exchange, in the normal case when both parties are hon-
est. Payment channels expected to boost the overall throughput
of a blockchain-based payment system. Through the use of SGX,
Teechain relaxes the synchrony assumptions in existing payment
channels and gains efficiency.
Consensus protocols. Another line of work leverages trusted ex-
ecution to enhance the resilience and performance of consensus
protocols. Based on traditional BFT protocols, systems such as
TrInc [27], CheapBFT [24], or Hybster [8] have shown how to en-
hance state-machine replication with trusted specialized hardware
devices, FPGAs, and SGX enclaves, respectively.
Some blockchain-specific peer-to-peer consensus protocols have
been introduced proposed that scale to a large number of nodes
based on trusted hardware. REM [48], for example, introduces
Proofs-of-Useful-Work that are run within SGX in order to reach
consensus on a public blockchain.
Furthermore, the consensus model of the Hyperledger Sawtooth
platform (https://github.com/hyperledger/sawtooth-core), origi-
nally contributed by Intel, includes the Proof-of-Elapsed Time (PoET)
consensus protocol based on SGX. It replaces the proof-of-work
function for leader election in Bitcoin’s Nakamoto consensus with a
mandatory, random waiting time imposed by an enclave running in
SGX; otherwise the protocol is similar to the Nakamoto consensus.
State continuity and TEEs. Kaptchuk et al. [25] address state con-
tinuity for memoryless secure processors that have access to a
distributed ledger. They construct a generic protocol for detecting
rollback attacks, assuming the processor is always given access to
latest ledger state. This is an interesting conceptual approach to
detect rollbacks, assuming an idealized trusted ledger that cannot
be rolled back.
9 CONCLUSION
This work has explored some pitfalls that arise from the combi-
nation of trusted execution with blockchains. In particular, smart-
contract executionwith Intel SGX promises protection for blockchain
applications with strong privacy demands. However, since enclaves
are susceptible to rollback attacks, a malicious blockchain peer
may break confidentiality by resetting an enclave to manipulate
the operation invocation order. We have presented a solution that
selectively utilizes SGX, minimizes the TCB, and handles rollbacks
for the Hyperledger Fabric platform. An evaluation has shown that
the overhead of our approach is within 10%–20% for a sealed-bid
auction application.
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